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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the trade-off between incentive effects and administrative costs associated with
the implementation of various environmental tax instruments, with special reference to carbon taxes.  In a
simple model, we show under what conditions it is optimal to use input rather than emission taxes to
internalize environmental externalities.  Mixed tax regimes are also studied.  If linkage of emissions to inputs
is close, if abatement possibilities are costly, and if administrative costs of emission taxes are high, emission
taxes should not be introduced.  It is shown that these conditions directly apply to current tax policies
toward CO2 emissions in several European countries that harness pre-existing energy taxes.  First, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between carbon content of energy and CO2 emissions.  Second, only few
possibilities exist to abate CO2 emissions separately.  Third, “piggy-backing” on existing administration for
energy excises allow to save on administrative costs.  Broadening the carbon tax base by removing certain
widely-used exemptions for energy production (and possibly adding emission taxes or abatement subsidies
for selected industries) is likely to increase incentives for carbon reduction without significant additional
administrative costs.
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1. Introduction
Implementing enviromnental policies --throughstandards, tradable permits or
environmental taxes alike --isfar from costless. For instance, whenimplementing an
environmental tax, the tax department has torun a special unit to enforce and collect taxes
and to monitor compliance. In practice, thecosts of implementing environmental policies
plays a significant role in the choice between differentpolicy options. The proposals of the
European Commission for a European wideenergy/C02-tax provide clear examples
(Vollebergh, 1995). Instead of proposing a totally new taxon C02-emissions, the European
Commission employed the close linkage betweenC02—emissions and the implicit taxation of
carbon by the existing taxes onenergy products (which are usually intermediate inputs).
Indeed, using existing instruments rather than introducingnew ones to address new policy
areas may save considerably on administrative costs.
However, just minimization of transaction costs mightcome at a cost for society. A
strategy based on input taxes, for example, foregoes the gains thatare potentially reaped by
a more direct way of taxing the externality through emissiontaxes. Any deviation from the
principle of taxing externalities at the point where they arise, introducesan incentive to
misallocate resources. Thus a trade-off arises betweenminnnizing transaction costs and
directly inducing incentive effects. The optimal tax structure hasto balance the burden of
complex and expensive-to-run tax systems against the incentives it inducesto internalize the
externality that is aimed to be addressed.
This paper investigates the potential trade-offbetween administrative costs and
incentives of environmental regulation, inparticular if the government aims to reduce CO22
emissions. We analyze how the optimal choice ofcarbon taxes is affected by the
administrative cost incurred by the regulator(government). Using a simple model, we
determine the optimal rates for emission andinput taxes in the presence of administrative
costs and which of these taxes should optimally be introduced.Moreover, we explore and
interpret the scarce empirical evidence on administrative costs oftaxation in the light of
optimal carbon taxation. As empirical information on the role ofimplementation cost in the
design of environmental policy is almost entirely lacking,we concentrate on what factors
might be expected to determine those costs, based on studies aboutadministrative costs
outside the environmental policy area.
Although most formal analysis of environmental regulationignores administrative
costs, compliance costs, or transaction costs in general, agrowing literature takes these
issues seriously (see overview of Krutilla, 1999).1Severalpapers recognize that
administrative costs may be important and rule out theuse of emission taxes on these
grounds. It is typically investigated which taxes could bestreplace or 'approximate'
emission taxes (Smith, 1992). Moreover, undersome circumstances other taxes or tax
combinations are even equivalent to perfect emission taxes(that is, emission taxes in a
world without transaction costs). For instance,Xepapadeas (1999) reviews the conditions
under which input taxes and emission taxes areequivalent. Eskeland and Devarajan (1996)
show how the combination of mandatedtechnology and output taxes approaches the ideal
emission tax. Fullerton and Wolverton (1997)propose to combine output taxes and
subsidies on clean goods, or more generaltwo-part instrument systems of a deposit-refund
nature, to replace the monitoring-costly emission tax.
The implicit assumption in thesepapers, however, is that emission taxes are3
prohibitively costly to administer and that other taxes havenegligibly low administrative
costs. We extend this approach by more explicitlytaking into account administrative costs
of all type of taxes, without assuming beforehand thatemission taxes will always be the
most costly type of tax from the administrative point of view.In particular we allow
different tax instruments to feature differences in administrativecosts, which, in addition,
are endogenously dependent on the tax rates. Once other taxesas well as emission taxes are
subject to significant administrative costs, it becomesunlikely that the first-best optimum
can be reached. Hence, alternative tax systems should be considered thatare no longer
equivalent to perfect emission taxes.
Shortle, Horran and Abler (1998) study to what extentinput taxes can approach
perfect emission taxes if not all inputs that directly affect emissionscan be taxed. We
extend their analysis by explicitly taking into account administrativecosts and allowing for
the simultaneous use of emission and input taxes. We findthat a mixed tax system might be
(second-best) optimal. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) arrive ata similar result in a model
of mixed output and emission taxation thatincorporates monitoring. We complement their
analysis by investigating input taxation and by exploring inmore detail how optimal tax
rates in the presence of administative costs differ fromPigouvian taxes. Administrative
costs in our model mainly represent costs stemming frommonitoring, and thus our paper is
related to the literature on monitoring and enforcement ofenvironmental policy (see Cohen
1998 for a survey). As we are primarily interested inoptimal taxation rather than optimal
monitoring, we do not model monitoring in an explicitway.
The theoretical part of this chapter is alsoclosely related to the chapter by Fullerton,
Hong and Metcalf (1999) in this volume. The twochapters complement each other in4
various respects. Both chapterscompare ideal emission taxes with alternative taxation, but
differ with respect to the production structure and thegovernment budget constraint. First,
Fullerton et al. analyse a model in which there isa on-to-one correspondance between input
use and emissions. Input taxes and emission taxes are thereforeequivalent, but output taxes
provide an (imperfect) substitute form of taxation. Incontrast, our model separates input
use from emissions, and considers abatement explicitly.Accordingly, we allow for three
ways to reduce pollution, viz, output reduction, input reduction and abatement. Westudy
input taxation as an (imperfect) substitute for emission taxes.Second, whereas Fullerton at
al. consider a second-best world with adistortionary labor tax for revenue-raising purposes,
the second-best nature of policies considered here arisesbecause of administrative costs.
Thus, the present chapter abstracts from tax-interaction effects dueto recycling effects.
The structure of our paper is as follows. First,we explain the nature of the trade-off
involved if the implementation cost of correctivetaxes, in particular administrative costs,
are considered explicitly. Second, we analyze a stylized model thatincorporates both
emission and input taxes to sort out critical determinantsthat shape this trade-off. Finally,
we evaluate both explicit and implicit carbon taxation in OECDcountries in terms of the
trade-off and suggest some opportunities for welfareimproving carbon tax policies. Note in
advance, that taxing carbon inputs is not equivalent totaxing CO2 emissions as is
sometimes suggested. Although a close linkage exist betweenthe carbon content of energy
products and C02-emissions, this is not a fixed chemo-technologicalrelationship as several
opportunities for carbon abatement or removal exist (Hollowayet.al., 1996).
2. The trade-off between incentives and administrativecosts5
Inthis section we argue that the administrative costargument per se is not sufficient to rule
out the implementation of emission taxes. In thepresence of administrative costs, the costs
and benefits associated with each specifictype of tax should be compared. First, we
hypothesize which factors influence the shape of the administrative costcurve. Next, we
show why administrative cost introduce such ageneral trade-off between cost and benefits
of different implementation strategies. We alsodevelop some useful terminology.
2.1. Administrative costs
We defme transaction costs as the costs associated with thetax assessment, collection and
enforcement, and all other costs incurred by any party to enable, faciliate, andensure
transactions from tax payers to tax authorities (Vollebergh, 1995). An alternativeterm that
we will use is implementation costs. The terms include ex-ante costs(e.g. cost of exclusion)
and ex-post costs (e.g. monitoring cost). It is conmion tocategorize these costs further into
cost for the government (tax receiver), or administrativecost, to handle forms and enforce
compliance, and the cost for the tax liable agent (tax payer), or compliancecost, to carry
out the obligations of calculating and paying the tax (see Sandfordet al. 1989). In our
analysis we concentrate on administrative cost.2
Administrative costs of a particular tax are closely related to the baseto which the tax
is applied. The tax base usually varies with thetype of tax. For example, an emission tax
taxes physical volumes of hazardous substances, while aninput tax taxes such substances
indirectly, for instance through its use as (intermediate) inputs. Inturn, these differences
induce both tax authorities and taxpayers to set up and maintain different systems for6
collecting and processing information about the tax, that is, to record how muchis emitted
or how much input is used, in order to be able to calculate total taxpayments due.
One important characteristic of the tax base that determines(differences in)
administrative costs is the number of agents liable to the tax. Alarge number of taxable
legal units implies a large implementation cost for the taxagency since each unit requires
separate treatment. Taxing a particular pollutant that is emitted bymany producers may be
associated with large administrative costs. Taxing the inputs from whichthe pollutant arises
as a by-product may be associated with significantly lower administrativecosts. For
instance, inputs need no longer be taxed at the points ofconsumption, but can also be taxed
at the point of delivery, such as gas stations or distributors ofelectricity. Hence, switching
from emissions to inputs as the tax base could change administrativecosts.
Note that the difference in administrative costs isindependent of the induced
regulatory effect. It is a difference in the fixed costcomponentof administrative cost. This
regards the set-up cost and part of the cost to run the informationsystem. Each liable unit
submits its own tax form. The cost of processing formsdepends on the number of forms
rather than the tax amount due. Nevertheless, this still leaves thepossibility of economies
of scale for a given type of tax. If the tax basecan be broadened across a larger number of
tax payers, the overall administrative cost per taxpayer can be reduced. A s e c o n d
important determinant of administrative costs is measurability of the base. Inmost cases
emission levels are likely to be more difficult tomeasure, report and record than input or
output levels. Heterogeneity across industries and their technologiescompounds to the
complexity of a tax system. For instance, a tax base in terms ofweighted units of7
measurement, rather than in terms of a single unit, may be expected to createhigher
administrative costs if firms use highly firm-specifictechnologies. One well-known
example is NOR-emissions from road transportation which depends on vehicletype,
equipment, fuel type, driving patterns, etc. (see also Hoel, 1998, p.89).
Administrative costs are also likely to vary with the tax rates and therevenue raised. The
possibility of evasion by tax payers asks for monitoring expenditures by regulators. The
remark by Fullerton (1995, p.7) that many of the administrative costs "are 'fixed'costs of
calculating the tax base, not marginal costs of collecting more revenue by raising the rate of
tax on a given tax base" seem to call for a qualification in thisrespect. The larger is the tax
bill, the larger are the incentives to evade tax payment and the more attractive it is for the
regulator to spend resource to reduce tax evasion.
Regulators usually have various strategies for monitoring and need to sort out the
efficient choice of monitoring levels and techniques. A large literatureon monitoring and
enforcement studies this policy in detail (Cohen 1998). Here,we do not need to dig into
this level of detail. With respect to environmental monitoring,we can safely assume that
when the optimal mix of monitoring instruments is chosen, totalcost of monitoring is
increasing in the extent to which stochastic elements determine actual pollution, in the
number of polluters, the variety of production and abatementtechniques used, and in the
difficulty of measuring emissions.
To sum up, no general shape can be assumed cx ante for differenttype of taxes.
However, it seems fruitful to assume that both fixed and variable costs(varying with the tax
rate) play a significant role. Both in theory and practice, we need acase-by-case approach8
to study the nature and implications of administrative costs.
2.2. The role of linkage
Efficiency of instruments to reach a certain policy goal is usually defined interms of the
extent to which the instrument increases social welfare. The most efficientinstrument to hit
a given target has the smallest gross welfare cost, wheregross welfare cost3 refers to the
change in welfare apart from that arising from the reduction in theexternality .
Ina first-best world without transaction costs, different instrumentscan be ranked in
terms of efficiency by investigating their effect on private welfare.Things become more
complicated in a world with transaction costs as both administrative cost and thelinkage
between regulatory aim, emission reduction, and thetype of tax used to regulate play a role
(Smith, 1992). First of all, different type of taxes usually differ withrespect to the
directness of the incentive they provide to reducing emissions(assuming emission reduction
reflects the goal of the government). Less direct taxation of themarginal damages caused
by an individual pollutor causes an efficiency loss butmay lower administrative costs.
Furthermore, different instruments not only differently distort private welfaredirectly, but
also indirectly through their implications for transactioncosts. The usual gross welfare cost
of taxation has to be supplemented by the transaction cost of thetax.
Before turning to how welfare analysis of environmental taxation isinfluenced by
transaction cost, it is useful to clarify and precisize ourterminology. We explicitly separate
out the transaction costs from the total change in welfare associated with theuse of a certain
(tax) instrument. Hence, in our case of environmental taxation,we distinguish (i)9
administrative (transaction) costs, (ii) the welfare gain from an improvement in the
environment, (iii) the "residual" welfare change, that is the gross welfare cost ignoring
transaction costs. The latter component will be called "private gross welfare cost" •6Au
instrument that has relatively low private gross welfare costs is called relatively privately
efficient. Of course, in a world without transaction costs, efficiency just coincides with this
notion of private efficiency, since gross welfare costs do not contain transaction costs.
Thus, the relative efficiency of different type of taxes can be measured with the
following formula:
U= Y-T--D(E) (1)
where U is social welfare of the representative agent, V is gross private welfare, T is the
welfare loss due to transaction (administrative) costs, and D is the damage from pollution.
Let t1andt2betwo different tax regimes that yield the same aggregate emissions: E(t1) =
E(t2).The private costs of t1arelower than those of t2if:Y(t1) >Y(t2).
We do not need to discuss extensively the determinants of "private efficiency" here,
since they are well-known from analyses without transaction costs. For example, the
efficiency of a tax to internalize pollution externalities is larger if the individual's tax bill is
more directly linked to the externality. Hence emission taxes are more (privately) efficient
than input taxes. Also, efficiency requires that the effective tax rate on marginal
contributions to damage (D) is equal across pollutors. Hence, an emission tax that applies to
all polluters is (privately) more efficient than an emission tax with exemptions or a non-
uniform emission tax.10
As noted in the introduction, it is often argued that emission taxesare too costly to
implement and that administrative costs provide a basic motivation for other(tax)
solutions.7 However, instead of simply assuming that sucha shift away from emission taxes
is optimal, we aim at explicitly deriving such a conclusion withina comprehensive welfare
framework. A first step in this direction has been taken by McKay, Pearson and Smith's
(1990) who hypothesize that a clear trade-off exists between shifts in the taxsystem to save
on transaction costs on the one hand, and tax reforms that harness incentives andpromote
(private) efficiency, on the other hand. They assume that regulation that is linked less
directly to the externality indeed saves on administrative costs, but that it comes at a cost
for society by distoring private decisions more.
Figure 1 illustrates. The horizontal axis measures different tax systems with respect to
the directness with which they address incentives to reduce damage. Forexample, an
emission tax ranks high, an input tax ranks low. Taxes on different inputs rankdifferently,
depending on the closeness of the linkage between input use and emissions subject to
regulation. The vertical axis measures two components of utility. The figurecompares a
continuum of different tax systems. It is assumed that all of them yield thesame level of
damage D by appropriate choice of tax rates. The two curves represent the other two
components of overall utility, transaction costs T and private utility Y, for each of the tax
systems. Administrative costs T increase when taxation is better linked to emissions. The
idea behind this is that more direct taxation implies less links to alreadyexisting procedures
of the existing tax system. The (private) utility loss Y also increases with thelinkage of
taxation to emissions. The more direct taxation is, the larger (private)utility is for a given
level of emissions.11
INSERT Figure 1
The optimal tax system balances transaction costs and efficiency. In the figure, welfare is
maximized by choosing an indirect tax that corresponds to points A and B. The complete
switch to emission taxes is too costly: the associated increase in administrative costs would
outweigh the gains from having a more direct tax with better incentives.
Figure 1 is hypothetical and suggestive. As noted before, we have to assess different
tax proposals case-by-case. For example, if marginal administrative costs increase only
slowly, emission taxes may be optimal despite the presence of administrative costs.
Moreover, it is not guaranteed at all that the curves T and Y have nice convex and concave
shapes respectively. Smulders and Vollebergh (1998), for instance, represent the linkage to
pollution by the fraction of (symmetric) sectors that is liable to an emission tax, and fmd in
a very simple setting that the Y curve first declines and then increases. In general,
administrative costs introduce non-convexities because of their fixed-cost nature, and the
conventional marginal approach to optimal taxation has to be extended.
Administrative costs have many dimensions. The government may affect
administrative costs by varying the number of firms or sectors subject to the tax, the tax
rates chosen for input and emission taxes, accuracy of measurability aimed for, and
enforcement spending to reduce the (probability of) tax evasion, and so on. Each of these
dimensions can be measured along the horizontal axis in a figure similar to Figure 1.
Needless to say, each of these factors directly influences the overall welfare effect of
implementing environmental taxes.
Not only the multi-dimensionality of administrative costs makes the simple diagram of12
Figure 1 problematic. As Feldstein has pointed out long ago (Feldstein, 1976), a careful
distinction should be made between the design of a tax system de novo and the reform of an
existing tax system. This is true for its associated administrative system as well. Indeed, in
practice every tax reformstartsfrom a given tax and administrative system inherited from
the past. This system determines the (short run) scope for welfare improving tax reform at
low administrative cost (Smith, 1992; Vollebergh, 1995).
For instance, increasing existing taxes, rather than introducing new taxes might save
on the "fixed costs" of administration and therefore on total administrative costs. Such
economies of scale and scope are also attractive to exploit when designing enviromnental
taxes. Levying environmentally motivated taxes on a base that is already taxed for other
purposes, rather than introducing an entirely new emission tax, would certainly save on
administrative costs. Furthermore, also economies of scope with the administrative system
used for other regulatory instruments may arise. When implementing environmental taxes,
the regulator could benefit from experience in related administrative procedures for
operations already undertaken. Like Smith (1992), we label this use of existing
administrative procedures and experience for new purposes "piggy-backing".
3. Critical determinants shaping the trade-off
This section develops a simple model along the lines of Kaplow (1990) and Shortle, Horran
and Abler (1998) to compare emission taxes and input taxes in the presence of
administrative costs. The aim of the regulator is to correct externalities from pollution. The
presence of administrative costs implies that the regulator should deviate from the first-best13
Pigouvian tax. Hence, administrative costs in itself cause policies to be second best. We
abstract from other second-best issues. In particular, we assume that lump-sum taxes and
transfers are available to the government, so that there is no revenue requirement that
affects tax rates and we can ignore labour taxes.8
3.1. The model
We assume a given number of heterogenous sectors, indexed i. Production of one unit of
fmal output q. requires labour I, and a single homogenous intermediate input x (in amount
xj. Moreover, firms can spend labour services on abatement a, which reduces emissions
per unit of output e•. The minimum labour requirement per unit of output equals 1(x1).
Labour and inputs are substitutes: I, '3i,Ix1 <0. Emissions per unit of output depend
negatively on abatement effort and positively on inputs: e1(a,x1)withe7, 'ae1Iaa <0 and
'ae,/ax1>
Finalgood producers face a (sector-specific) emission tax and a (per unit) input tax
(tfl).Perfectcompetition prevails, and firms take the output price P as given. They
maximize profits by choosing output, abatement and input levels. We normalize the wage to
unity. The first order conditions can be written as:
p1 =I,+a1+e•(p+ t1)x1, (2)
1 ￿(—eaj')c and waloe,'° (3)14
+ t+ r1e'￿— l' and waloe. (4)
Equation (2) says that price equals cost which in turn equals labour cost for production,
labour cost for abatement, and taxes due per unit of output. Condition (3) states that with
positive abatement levels, the marginal cost of abatement (on the left-hand side) equals the
marginal benefits in the form of reduces emission tax payments (on the right-hand side).
Condition (4) equates the marginal cost to the marginal benefits of input use. Marginal
input costs consist of price of the input p,thesector-specific input tax tandthe induced
additional emission tax payments. Marginal benefits consists of the labour saving in
production.
The intermediate good is produced with labour only and subject to constant returns to
scale. We choose units such that one unit of labour produces one unit of the intermediate.
For simplicity we assume that the production of the intermediate input is non-polluting (but
this can be easily modified in a way that is completely analogous to pollution in the final
goods sector). Intermediate good producers face a price p which they take as given. Hence,
their first order condition for profit maximization simply states that the price equals the
wage which is normalized to one:
(5)
Equilibriumin the market for the input requires:11
X=x1q115
where X is total supply of the intermediate good.
We impose a very simple demand structure by choosing a quasi-linear utility function
with no cross-demand effects, and where the opportunity cost of labour is constant (and
normalized to one). The utility function is:
U =u(q1)+ 1 -D(E) (6)
where l is leisure, D is damage from emissions, and E is aggregate emissions defined as
E = (7)
Consumers take prices and emissions as given and maximize utility, subject to their budget
constraint p1q1=L—10+Z,where Z are transfers from the government. The first order
conditions read:
(8)
The government collects tax revenue, pays civil servants for the tax administration (I) and
rebates the remainder of tax revenue to households in a lump-sum fashion (Z). The tax
administration employs T units of labour at wage w =1. The required administrative costs
are sector-specific and depend on sectoral taxes and output levels.12
T= F1(I,Ia,) + V( z, t,q) (9)16
where F represents the fixed cost of the tax system, and V represents the administrative
costs varying with the size of the rates and bases of the tax system. Fixed costs are
determined only by certain taxes being implemented or not. This is modeled by the
dependence of F on indicator functions ) each of which takes a value 1 if tax t'(e.g.is
positive and a value zero if the tax is zero. The natural restrictions we impose are sign %'
= signf for any tax tthatis both taxes and subsidies are costly to implement, and
V(0,0,q1) =0,that is, all fixed costs are excluded from VQ.
The labour market clears. Labour endowment is fixed and given by L. Hence, we
write:
L =l+ (l+a+x1)q1 + T (10)
Substituting (7) and (10) into (6), we may write utility as:
U =u1(q1)+ L -(1+a1+x1)q1-T-DQeq) (11)
Totally differentiating utility, and substituting the first order conditions for firms' and
households' maximization problems (2), (3), (4), (5) and (8), we obtain:
dU = dT-(D'-r,)dE, (12)
where E—eq is total emissions in sector i and Xx1q1istotal input use in sector i. Equation
(12) shows the welfare impacts associated with changes in input demands, transaction costs,17
and environmental quality. The first term on the right-hand side of (12) stand for the
distortionary effect of excises on the goods market associated with input taxes. The last
term reveals that a reduction in emissions ceteris paribus improves utility as long as the
marginal damage is larger that the emission tax.
3.2. Optimal taxation
We can rewrite (12) so as to separate the three components of welfare as in (1):
dU=> [1dE1+t1dx,]—dT-D"dE (13)
Equation (13) categorizes the welfare effect of any policy in the three components
mentioned in section 2.2. The bracketed term on the right-hand side is the private gross
welfare effect of the policy (in line with (1) to be denoted by dl'), dT is the transaction cost
of the policy, and -D 'dE=-dD is the environmental welfare gain. Note that the private
gross welfare cost is a tax base effect. The change in each tax base times the tax rate
corresponding to that tax base together determine this effect.'3
In the presence of administrative costs, a necessary condition for optimality of the tax
system is that the expression in (13) is zero. The government maximizes welfare, taking as
given the reactions of households and firms to changes in taxes. It faces a two-stage
decision problem: i) deciding which taxes to use (tax base decision), and ii) setting the
appropriate tax level (tax rate decision).
Concerning the tax rate decision, we find conditions for optimal taxation by rewriting18
(12) in terms of the total derivatives with respect to each of the taxes, and setting these
expressions equal to zero.14 For any tax (this condition reads:
dU dx.dT dE.




Equation (14) guides the tax rate decision, conditional on the tax being implemented.
Concerning the tax base decision, the regulator should compare utility levels
associated with any combination of taxes implemented at the rate implied by (14). The
optimal tax system may include non-zero taxes, set at the level implied by (14), as well as
zero taxes, that is, taxes that are not implemented. For the latter taxes, equation (14) may
be violated, that is, utility may marginally increase in this tax. Yet it is optimal not to
implement these taxes. The reason is that, by construction, in an optimally designed tax
system, setting any tax belonging to the latter catagory at the level implied by (14) --and
adjusting all non-zero tax rates such that they satisfy (14) --decreaseswelfare (non-
marginally) because of fixed administrative costs. Similarly, in an optimally designed tax
system, switching the rate of any non-zero tax from the rate implied by (14) to a zero rate --
andadjusting all other non-zero taxes such that they satisfy (14) --decreaseswelfare (non-
marginally). Since fixed administrative costs play a role, the tax base decision is subject to
non-convexities and no simple "smootht' optimality condition can be written down.
Instead of optimizing the overall tax system, a more practical issue is to find a welfare19
improving taxreform. Suchan approach takes account of the fact that actual changes of the
tax system are usually slow and piecemeal due to the role of the existing tax system
(Feldstein 1976), and, as we like to add, its associated administrative costs. A change in an
existing tax system is worth pursuing if this change entails an increase in welfare even if
not the maximum level of welfare is reached. In particular, we are interested in the welfare
effects of the introduction of a new tax, if some taxes already exist (as well as their
associated tax administration). The obvious rule for a welfare-improving introduction of a
new tax is that the net welfare gain from exploiting the newly introduced tax should exceed
the fixed cost of introducing the tax. For any tax tthiscondition can be written as:'5
=j'Of [ f_dI]￿ F (15) dt
where tvisthe level of the tax that corresponds to (14) (that is the solution to dU/c=O, or
the corner solution 0), F dTIdI(t)isthe 'fixed cost" (set-up administrative cost) associated
with introducing tax 1, t' is the (second-best) optimal tax rate,16 and we evaluate all total
derivatives taking into account changes in other taxes so as to satisfy (14) for all other
taxes.
As a benchmark, consider the (first-best) case without transaction costs, i.e.
T=dT=0. As is well-known, the optimal emission tax then equals the marginal damage D'
in each sector and all other taxes should be zero.'7 This can be immediately seen from (12).
Indeed (14) is satisfied for these tax rates. Under the usual conditions on utility and20
production functions, the tax base optimality condition is automatically met since fixed
costs do not play a role and the maximization problem is convex. Starting from a situation
without any taxes, introducing the emission tax improves welfare.18
The first-best outcome may be realized in some special cases even if transaction costs
play a role. Obviously, if transaction costs are associated with other taxes, but not to
emission taxes, the Pigouvian tax should still be implemented. The other way around, if
transaction costs apply to emission taxes only, and other taxes can be implemented without
such costs, a first-best outcome may arise provided that other taxes (or tax combinations)
are equivalent to emission taxes with respect to their incentive effects ("private efficiency").
For example, if the emission input ratio is fixed, an input tax can bring about the first best
outcome.19
A second-best situation arises when other taxes also involve transaction costs or when
other instruments are privately less efficient than emission taxes. Once transaction costs
play a role, it is no longer guaranteed that emission taxes should be uniform, nor that
output or input taxes should be excluded. Most of the literature on second-best optimal
environmental taxation concentrates on cases in which other taxes (taxes on output or
inputs) can replace emission taxes without loss of incentives and without administrative
costs (see, for example, the double dividend literature, De Mooij 1999).
If administrative costs are mentioned as a reason not to use emission taxes, the most
common case in the literature is the one where emission taxes are too costly to be
implemented because of transaction costs associated with emission taxes but not with other
taxes (the most discussed case is non-point pollution, see Xepapadeas 1999). Our model
allows for more subtle impacts of administrative costs by considering administrative costs21
throughout the entire tax system and taking into account that administrative costs may
endogenously vary with tax rates. To investigate these in more detail, we consider some
special cases.
3.3. Pure emission taxes
Let us first focus on emission taxes by considering the case where all other taxes are ruled
out. Note that we caimot simply suppose that only emission taxes are used, but that we have
to explain whithin the model why this is so. We will give this explanation in the next
subsection and concentrate here on the optimality conditions for emission taxes only.
Evaluating (14) for an emission tax in sector i, we find that the following optimality
conditions should hold:
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This tax should be implemented if the total welfare gain exceeds the fixed administrative22
cost, see (15). We approximate the welfare gain by a second order Taylor expansion,
evaluated atz°. The optimal taxis given by
1dE. dT. =if —1 (TO)2 +('lEI+ ￿ F.
(18)
*= 0otherwise
where TiEandare the positively-defined elasticities of dE/d r and dT/d iwithrespect to
Conditions (17) and (18) reveal two cases in which it is optimal not to use emission taxes in
a particular sector because of administrative costs. The first case is the case in which the
fixed costs of administering the tax are large relative to the total potential gains, see (18).
The gains are small indeed if emissions are insensitive to the emission tax, that is, if
abatement and changes in the input mix are expensive (dE1/dsmall), if the marginal
damage (D) is small, and if marginal administrative costs (dT/d z) are large.2° A second
case in which a sector should be optimally exempted from an emission tax is the case that
marginal administrative costs for the sector are relatively large, such that, for any small
increase in the sector-specific emission tax, higher administrative costs more than offset
gains from the induced emissions reduction (dU/d <0 for any z so that rf—O).
Figure 2 illustrates the case of emission taxes in terms of the trade-off between23
efficiency and administrative costs (see section 2). Private gross welfare, Y, is maximized
for zero emission taxes, since --looselyspeaking --emissiontaxes impede free market
forces. However, they reduce damage D and hence improve social welfare. In a first-best
world without administrative costs, the Pigouvian tax maximizes welfare Y-D. In the
presence of administrative costs T, the gross welfare cost of emission taxation (that is, the
effect on U—D) is higher and rises more steeply with tax rates. The (second-best) optimal
tax maximizes Y-T-D and it can be easily seen that this tax is below the first-best tax. In
panel b of Figure 2, transaction costs rise steeply with the tax rate and the fixed cost
component is large. As a result the second-best optimal emission tax is zero.
INSERT Figure 2
How emission taxes should be optimally differentiated across sectors is also revealed by
condition (17), conditional on being implemented. Note that the optimal tax equals marginal
damage minus a correction term that is proportional to marginal administrative costs. The
optimal tax equals the Pigouvian tax if marginal administrative costs are zero (dT/dç=O).
The gap between optimal taxes and the Pigouvian tax widens if administrative costs rise
steeply with tax levels and if emissions are not very sensitive to emission taxation. The
latter may arise because of a low elasticity of demand (it is hard to accomplish emission
reductions by cutting demand) or because the emission intensity is not very sensitive to
emission tax changes (steeply rising abatement and input substitution costs). To clarify this,
we decompose the emissions reduction effect of the tax, that emerges as the denominator in
(17), into these three effects:24
=€. + c+ (19)
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dq. dq.






that is, Erepresentsthe effect of emission taxes on emiss ons through changes in demand, a
measures the direct effect of emission taxation on emissions through abatement, and A
measures the analogous effect through input reduction (the reason to separateand A
becomes clear in the next subsection).
So far, we have assumed that administrative costs rise with tax rates because25
incentives to evade increase with the tax rate, thus raising the cost for the tax authority to
administer the tax. The opposite, however, is possible as well. Using a partial-equilibrium
model, Polinsky and Shavell (1982) find that the optimal emission tax in the presence of
administrative costs may be larger than the Pigouvian tax. The argument is that a higher
emission tax saves on transaction costs if administrative costs depend on the number of tax
paying finns and if an increase in the emission tax reduces market demand and the number
of firms. In our set-up the number of firms is indeterminate because of the constant returns
to scale production functions, but the equation immediately shows that Polinsky and
Shavell's result also applies here if administrative costs decrease with the tax rate, that is if
dT/d<O.
3.4. Input taxes: the role of linkage
To investigate the trade-off between emission taxes and input taxes, we first consider
sector-specific taxes on emissions (z) and on the use of input x (ç,). Evaluating (14) for
these taxes, we find:2'
dT/dr. x.
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Notethatmeasures the direct effect of input taxation on emissions,22 X measures the
elasticity of the emission function with respect to input use, and 3 measures how much
input use is more sensitive to input taxation than to emission taxes.
According to (24), input taxes can serve as environmental taxes and reduce the need
for explicit emission taxes. Note that the first two tenns are the same as in (17) after
substitution of (19). The smaller is the direct emission tax effectA. + c =— dE/dr; the
larger is not only the effect of marginal administrative costs on optimal emission taxes, but
also the larger is the scope for input taxes to replace emission taxes as appears from the
third term in (24). Indeed, with high marginal administrative costs of emission taxes, input
taxes only should be used as environmental tax and should be set according to (25) with
z=O, which can be written as:
dE./dt. dT/dt.
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Notethat inputs should then be taxed according to their marginal emission content dE1/dX,
times marginal damage D 'corrected for administrative costs as a result of changes in input27
use. (Of course we must make the provision that in the presence of large fixed
administrative costs, such that (15) is violated for t,, the input tax should not be
implemented.)
Replacing emission taxes by input taxes reduces efficiency. Input taxes distort the
input mix and fail to provide direct incentives for abatement. Only if the input to emission
ratio is constant and there are no abatement possibilities, then input taxation and emission
taxation are equivalent in the absence of transaction costs. This corresponds to e./x, =
constant,A ==1,and a =0. With an interior solution, conditions (24) and (25) can then
be rewritten as:
/ 1dT 1 dT D — — t.x./e. =_____ =_____ _________ . (28) 1 XI e.+. dt.€+.d(tx/e.)
With a fixed emission input ratio, input and emission taxes would be equivalent in the
absence of administrative costs (as is well-known, see e.g. Xepapadeas 1999). Indeed,
according to (25), with zero marginal administrative costs, any combination of taxes such
that z+tx/e1=D 'would achieve the first best optimum. This implies that the two taxes are
equally efficient in terms of the sum of gross private welfare and the enviromnental benefit
(see section 2). Hence, transaction costs considerations entirely determine the choice
between the two taxes.
Differences in (fixed and/or variable) administrative costs across tax instruments
remove the indeterminacy in the optimal tax choice. First, if fixed administrative costs
differ across the two taxes but administrative costs are not affected by tax rate levels, to28
satisfythe "entry-condition" only the tax with lowest fixed administrative cost should be
introduced, either ort,x1/e=D'. Note that the effective tax on pollution equals
marginal damage (the Pigouvian tax). Second, when both tax rates increase administrative
costs, the effective tax on pollution (z + tx/e) should be smaller than marginal damage D'.
When,in addition, the sum of fixed costs of administration for the two taxes are sufficiently
small to justify the introduction of both taxes, the taxes should be set so as to minimise
variable administrative costs, as appears from the second equality in (26).
In the general case of variable and sector-specific emissions per unit of input, input
taxes are less efficient than emission taxes. Hence, if at the same time administrative costs
for emission taxes are higher, efficiency and administrative costs may be optimally traded
off by choosing a mixed system of input and emission taxes. Solving (24) and (25) for an
interior solution, and for simplicity assuming that abatement and input use separately affect
emission (e"=O so that =1/?.), we obtain:
tOD/ht+1dtT+ul÷idlT (29) .€. djr.& .€. dt.
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4measuresthe "efficiency edge" of emission taxes over input taxes. Indeed with a constant
emission input ratio (a=O and ?=1),we have i0, and (29)-(30) collapse to (28). The
efficiency edge of emission taxes increases in abatement possibilities c and in IA—1 .We
call this latter expression the extent of linkage between emissions and inputs. The closer is
the elasticity of emissions with respect to inputs (A) to unity, the closer is the
correspondence between inputs and emissions and the more efficiently can input taxes
mimic emission taxes. Equations (29) and (30) reveal that marginal administrative costs are
less important to determine the optimal tax rates if the efficiency of emission taxes relative
to input taxes ()islarger, i.e. if the more abatement possibilities abound (c larger) and
emissions are more closely linked to inputs (A closer to one).
3.5Conclusions
To internalize environmental externalities in the presence of administrative costs, pure
emission taxes are optimal only under specific conditions. These conditions include (i) low
fixed administrative costs, (ii) not too steeply rising administrative costs (as a result of
increases in emission taxes) relative to marginal damage and direct emission reduction
effect of emission taxes, and (iii) relatively low incentives effects from alternative
environmental taxes (taxes on polluting inputs) to reduce emissions. The optimal second
best rate of emission taxes falls short of marginal damage.
Input taxes may serve indeed serve as (optimal) environmental taxes. With close
linkage between input use and emissions, and if abatement of emissions (as an alternative
means to reduce the pollution intensity of production besides changing the input mix) is30
relatively costly, taxes on polluting inputs may supplement emission taxes that fall short of
marginal damage to internalize pollution externalities more fully. In this case a mixed
system of emission taxes and input taxes is optimal, essentially because it saves on
administrative costs with only moderately affecting incentives to reduce emission. If linkage
is close and abatement expensive, and if also administrative costs associated with input
taxation are sufficiently low relative to administrative costs associated with emission
taxation, input taxes should fully replace emission taxes.
4. Carbon taxation and administrative costs
In this section we assess existing and potential environmental taxes relevant for climate
change policy, in particular through carbon taxation. We argue that current policy
(proposals) can be substantially improved if the trade-off between incentive regulation and
administrative costs is explicitly taken into account. We concentrate on the explicit carbon
taxes introduced in a number of European countries since the beginning of the 1990s. We
first review relevant facts on existing carbon taxes, then present evidence on administrative
costs, next assess current carbon taxes, and, finally, discuss scope for improvement.
4.1Carbontaxes in practice
Since the early 1990s, taxes are considered seriously to combat climate change, in
particular carbon taxes that would curb C02-emissions (e.g. Pearce, 1991; Cnossen and
Vollebergh, 1992; Poterba, 1992). The debate in Europe was strongly influenced by a31
proposal of the European Commission (see COM(92)226) for a hybrid EU-tax on
energy/CO2 to be implemented at the European level. The basic idea behind this proposal is
to bring the (minimum) rate structure more in accordance with the carbon content across
currently taxed energy products, mainly hydrocarbon fuels, as well as to extend the carbon
tax base to energy products that are not yet subject to an excise. The same idea is also
behind the carbon taxes actually implemented in several European countries.
INSERT Table 1
Thus the aim is to raise the implicit taxation of carbon at the margin. As is well-known CO2
emitted per kind of fuel differs considerably (see Table 1). Clearly, oil emits less carbon
than coal does. Natural gas, in turn, is cleaner than oil. The obvious implication is that
emission intensities also can be reduced by internalizing the respective carbon contents in
the price of each kind of fossil fuel. By differentiating the fossil fuel excise by carbon
emission coefficient instead of energy content coefficient, or even a hybrid coefficient, the
consumption of carbon is put at a disadvantage at the margin. Thus, users would be
induced to substitute oil for coal and natural gas for coal and oil, and, further, nonfossil
fuels for fossil fuels.
However, the EU proposal was never implemented due to considerable resistance of
industry and specific countries like the UK. Despite this failure to implement an EU-wide
carbon tax, several individual European countries have introduced explicit carbon taxes (see
also Table 2). Finland, at that time not a Member State, was the first country to impose a
C02-tax in 1990. This environmental tax is additional to an excise tax (basic duty) and32
calculated according to the carbon and energy content of the energy products. Furthermore,
it is imposed on primary energy inputs, including heavy fuel oil, LPG, coal and natural
gas.
INSERT Table 2
Other Nordic countries followed soon: Norway and Sweden in 1991, and Denmark in
1992. The C02-tax in Norway affects the use of mineral oils, coal, natural gas and
petroleum on the continental shelf. Interestingly, CO2 tax rates differ between these
products with petroleum and natural gas (sic!) taxed most heavily (per unit C02) and heavy
fuel oil and coal at a much lower level. Also electricity production and consumption is
taxed. The CO2 tax of Sweden applies to primary energy inputs, such as natural gas and
coal, but also includes heavy fuel oil and gas oil. The Danish tax is levied on all energy
products with the exception of petrol and amounts to a tax rate reform from $/liter to $/unit
carbon. A tax reform in 1996 explicitly distinguishes energy consumption in industry
according to categories of room heating, light processes and heavy processes with tax rates
varying accordingly.
The Netherlands already have an environmental tax on fuels (hydrocarbon oils) since
1988, with the C02-component added in 1990. However, only the regulatory tax on energy
from 1996 was specifically aimed to achieve carbon emission reduction by households and
small firms. The tax base included primary energy products while the tax rates correspond
to the proposed C02-energy tax of the EU. Also Austria imposed an energy tax on
electricity and natural gas in 1996.33
In a recent analysis of these carbon taxes, Ekins and Speck (1999) show how
exemptions for industry are used to provide considerable tax relief for certain sectors facing
considerable 'competitive pressure'. Tax relief is usually established by applying lower or
zero carbon tax rates or systems of rebate for specific industries which use these products
as inputs (often in addition to exemptions already provided for already existing energy
excises). Sometimes a maximum is set to the tax liability for specific energy-intensive
industries, like the steel industry, usually in terms of a percentage of sales value (this
provision was also envisaged in the hybrid EU-tax). Finally, improvements in energy-
efficiency are promoted by explicitly targeted tax reliefs. As a result, nominal and effective
tax rates for specific industries tend to differ considerably.
INSERT Table 3
Table 3 shows for several energy products that both Sweden, Denmark and Norway apply
much lower effective rates for specific industries. Only Finland does not apply lower rates,
although this heavily debated now. Furthermore, it is remarkable that considerable
differences exist in tax rates per ton CO2 across energy products, especially in Norway.
Norway, like Finland, exempts LPG, while coal and natural gas are taxed (much) more
heavily than is oil.
The carbon taxes in the Nordic countries are quite similar to the original proposal for
a common carbon tax within the EU jurisdiction (see COM(92)226 and its evaluation by
Smith and Vollebergh, 1993). This tax is aimed to lower the use of fossil fuels in
proportion to their carbon content. The European carbonlenergy tax, the first explicit34
uniform Union-wide tax, was proposed as an additional tax on top of the (non) existing
taxes. Since the tax base would include several energy products that were not subject to tax
before, the proposal also broadens the tax base of current energy taxes. Thus, an incentive
would be provided for industry and consumers to reduce their use of carbon-based energy,
and hence for CO2 emissions to be reduced.
As this EU proposal was never implemented, a later proposal was more closely linked
to the existing drafts on Mineral Oil Excise Harmonization (see COM(95)172) and
therefore concentrated effort on a much smaller carbon tax base (see Table 2 and its
evaluation in Vollebergh, 1995). In 1997 the European Commission came up with a new
proposal to use the directive on excise harmonization across EU countries more specifically
for the purpose of carbon tax policy (see Ekins and Speck, 1999, for further details).
According to this proposal the minimum target levels for the existing excise taxes on
mineral oils should be raised in three steps, while also small minimum rates on primary
energy products, like coal and natural gas, are proposed, as well as a tax on electricity (see
Table 2 for the proposed rates for 2000).
All EU proposals allow for exemptions. In the 1992 draft directive an exemption
would depend on a case-by-case assessment of the degree of competitive pressure faced
from countries not taking equivalent measures. Member states could grant firms a reduction
in the carbon tax payable (through an exemption or an equivalent refund), if energy costs
(minus value added tax) amount to at least 8 per cent of value added. In addition, the
proposed directive in 1992 also allows for reductions or refunds if firms invest in energy
efficiency improvements or abate carbon.
Summarizing, the recently introduced (unilateral) carbon taxes in several European35
countriesindeed broaden the existing (implicit) carbon tax base by including specific
primary energy products, like coal and natural gas. These products were usually not taxed
before. Usually the agents who pay the tax are mainly (downstream) distributors of fmal
fuel products or electricity at the point of delivery to households, small and large
businesses. Furthermore, with the exception of Norway, the tax rate is equal per unit
carbon across energy products and is interwoven with (existing) energy excise rates, if
available. Finally, with the exemption of Finland, all Nordic countries choose to exempt
*specific agents, mainly energy-intensive industries, by applying (much) lower or even zero
carbon tax rates.
4.2 Evidence on administrative costs
Empirical estimation of the administrative costs of different environmental tax policies is,
to our knowledge, absent. The same holds for compliance cost with only a few exceptions,
such as Fullerton's (1996) analysis of the Superfund's Corporate Environmental Tax. Also
direct estimates of the administrative costs of carbon taxes are lacking. Therefore this
section reviews the existing evidence on the administrative costs of taxation in general, and
the factors that appear from this literature as relevant for the level of these costs.
The lack of evidence on administrative cost is not surprising as only few explicit
environmental taxes exist in practice (see for example Fullerton 1996). Explicit
environmental taxes are those for which the legislator has expressed explicitly the aim that
this tax should serve some environmental purpose. However, the analysis of environmental
taxation and administrative cost would be severely restricted if one limits the analysis to36
explicit environmental taxes only. As shown in the previous section, also input taxes are
important for environmental purposes. Indeed, taxes like excises and VAT matter for the
environment (taxes on petrol and motoring), as well as facilities in the income tax (tax
allowances for commuting expenses, mine exploration, pollution control equipment, etc) •23
For carbon taxation, current energy taxes, like excises on hydrocarbon oils, are the most
important as they are likely to have an impact on emissions through changes in input mix
and changes in demand for energy.
Unfortunately, empirical information on the administrative costs of other taxes is
scarce as well. Only a few studies exist.24 Many problems exist regarding how to measure
these costs, especially their absolute levels. One issue is the significant element of
transferability between compliance costs and administrative costs (Sandford et al. p. 203).
Also, difficulties arise in categorizing operating costs. For instance, the (marginal) cost of
transferring forms is highly influenced by the level of integration with existing
administration.
Table 4 summarizes the results of Sanford et al. (1989). Both administrative and
compliance costs of each tax are expressed as a percentage of the revenue raised by the tax.
Administrative cost vary from 0.12% for the Petroleum revenue tax to 1.53 % for the
income tax. The overall picture is clear: income tax and VAT are relatively expensive to
administer, while especially excise duties are inexpensive in terms of administrative costs.
This finding is also in accordance with fmdings in other studies: although the OECD (1988)
provides lower estimates on the total cost of VAT (between 0.40 and 1.09%), this study
also ranks income taxes as being relatively most expensive and excises (interpreted as
single-stage general consumption tax) as being least expensive to implement (total cost37
around O.5%)!
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As Sandford etal.also include compliance costs, we can test whether we bias our analysis
by focusing on administrative costs only. On average, compliance costs are 3 times higher
than administrative costs. Compliance costs are relatively higher only for VAT. It is more
important for our purposes, however, that the ranking of different types of taxes according
to implementation costs is the same whether we use administrative costs or total operating
costs. Hence, the basic picture is not influenced by adding compliance cost. The similar
relative importance of compliance, and administrative costs across different taxes suggests
that administrative costs can be taken as being representative for both.
We now turn to the factors that determine the level of the administrative costs (see
also section 2.1). Administrative cost as a percentage of the total revenue raised by a tax is
not very relevant for the choice between different type of taxes. It is more important to
know their fixed and variable cost characteristics, and how they are affected by the choice
of tax base and rate. Unfortunately, such information is available only in a very limited
way. As far as the role of the number of tax payers is concerned, empirical information on
the administrative cost of VAT indeed suggests the existence of economies of scale as far as
the number of tax payers is concerned. In that case costs per registered business should be
relatively lower in countries with a low small-business exemption than in countries with a
high exemption: broadening the tax base across a larger number of tax payers reduces
overall administrative cost per tax payer. Cnossen (1994, p.1652) notes that the data38
observed by OECD (1988), with the exception of Denmark, indeed fit this observation.
Another important determinant of administrative costs is measurability of the tax
base. One factor here are differences among tax payers. Some tax payers will be more
expensive to tax due to specific characteristics that have to be checked. Again an interesting
example is the small-business exemption in VAT. The larger the exemption, the smaller the
number of registered businesses, and the lower the absolute levels of administrative cost
(see Cnossen, 1994, p.1652). Usually exemptions will be responsible for higher
administrative cost. For instance, to give a tax rebate to a particular industry requires extra
excise officers to handle and check such claims. Of course, exemptions for specific agents
can also lower administrative costs if the agent is neither liable for tax payment nor for a
rebate. We did not fmd evidence for the assumption that more complex forms for
calculating the tax base would raise administrative cost. Also no empirical studies have not
tried to quantify the precise shape of the fixed and variable cost component of
administrative costs of different tax types in relation to the use of differences in tax rates.
No decisive empirical information exist on the (general) shape of the transaction cost
curve for different type of taxes, especially environmental taxes. Moreover, as observed by
Cnossen (1994, p.1663), the fmdings of Sandford eta!.(1989) on the comparatively high
VAT compliance costs are in clear contrast with evidence on VAT compliance costs in
Germany. Here the estimated cost are only a fraction of the costs observed for the UK,
which is mainly explained by the much longer tradition and experience in Germany, and the
integration of VAT with the administration of the business income tax. Thus, even if some
information exist, the evidence seems to be dependent on local circumstances and
institutional settings.39
The implementation and enforcement of environmental taxes, however, has much in
common with the operation of the age-old excises on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum
products (Cnossen, 1977). Generally, these excises rely on quantitative measurement for
assessment purposes, with compliance ensured through physical controls. Similar close
controls should be exercised at points of import.26 Thus, it seems safe beforehand not to
expect always prohibitively high administrative costs for environmental taxes. This might
be different only if the regulatory tax base asks for monitoring of emissions which are
difficult to measure, and therefore require costly metering technology.
Furthermore, the change in administrative costs depends heavily on the sectors
already subject to other existing taxes or environmental regulation. For instance, according
to Hoornaert (1991, p.87), the physical control necessary for energy excises is very closely
related to carbon taxes, while administrative controls for VAT are quite different and more
time-consuming. The same might hold for other regulatory procedures which are already in
force. Usually direct controls for environmental purposes also reflect tight supervision of
technological processes and quantitative measurement. Thus, if closely linked production
processes are already subject to monitoring, administrative costs need not be very high.
Summarizing, the level of administrative cost depends much on how emissions
specifically relate to the production processes, their heterogeneity and the number of these
processes included in the tax base. Using existing excises for environmental regulation
might be a relatively cheap way of taxing bads since tax officers already have a lot of
information required to operate the tax system.
4.3 Assessment in terms of the trade-off40
As noted before, the overall effect on welfare of introducing 'new' environmental taxes,
like carbon taxes, should be compared to the incentives provided by the tax. An important
result of our theoretical model is that input taxes offer an interesting alternative for
emission taxes if three conditions are met (see the end of section 3.4 in particular). First,
there should be a 'clear linkage between inputs and emissions. Second, only few
possibilities must exist to abate carbon emissions separately. Third, administrative cost of
emission taxes should be high. In this section we argue that these conditions are indeed met
in the case of carbon taxation which supports the strategy chosen by the different countries
applying these taxes. At the same time, however, the current design of the carbon taxes in
practice leaves considerable room for improvements.
The first condition is related to the linkage issue (measured through I— 1as part of
the "efficiency edge" 4insection 3.4). In the carbon case C02-emissions are indeed in a
1:1 correspondence to the carbon-content in energy products used as inputs (e.g. crude or
refined oil products, natural gas and different types of coal). Moreover, (potential) harmful
C02-emissions are mainly related to the consumption of fossil fuels in modern societies.
Thus, rather than taxing each unit of carbon emitted separately, it is rational to use taxes on
energy products which contain carbon to pursue climate change objectives. Such taxes on
energy products provide indirect incentives, using the relationship between the burning of
these products and transactions which can more easily be taxed. Thus instead of taxing the
emissions from car exhausts, additional tax may be levied on petrol purchases, on the
assumption that the environmental damage caused is proportional to the amount of petrol
used.
This approach is indeed largely reflected in the carbon taxes applied in practice. They41
all take advantage of this fact by using carbon content of fuels as its tax base (although
often a hybrid tax base is applied with a combination of both carbon and energy content).
Thus coal-based energy production processes are put at a disadvantage compared to other
fossil and non-fossil fuel energy products. The same holds for oil relative to natural gas and
non-fossil fuels. This is entirely in alliance with the purpose of the tax: providing much
better targeted incentives compared to an indirect excise tax on energy alone. However,
applying differences in tax rates per unit of carbon, as in the Norwegian case, cannot be
justified and the rate structure applied considerably weakens its incentive effect (e.g. coal is
taxed at a much lower rate compared to natural gas which contains fewer units of carbon
per unit of energy).
The second important condition is that only few possibilities should exist to abate
carbon emissions separately (measured through a as part of the "efficiency edge" zli). If
emissions are very sensitive to emission taxation, that is if agents can abate C02-emissions
easily, input taxes might become inefficient because they do not provide appropriate
incentives for reducing carbon emissions directly. In other words, a loss in efficiency of
input taxes can be expected only if direct carbon abatement is possible, though not
stimulated by a tax levied on the agents who are responsible for these C02-emissions. With
respect to the abatement of carbon emissions ('carbon disposal') indeed relatively few
possibilities are available and almost none is actually employed.27 Furthermore, these
possibilities can usually be applied only on a rather large scale. Therefore they are outside
the reach of small individual firms or households. Thus the use of input taxes in the case of
carbon is indeed justified in this respect, in particular because the explicit carbon tax rates
are considerably low.2842
The third condition is that administrative cost related to emission taxes should be
high, or, in other words, the cost of input taxation should be relatively small (see equations
(29) and (30) in particular). Usually administrative cost of newly designed taxes are
relatively expensive due to a fixed set-up cost element of monitoring activities. This also
applies to excise taxes, whether they are emission or input taxes, even though they are
cheap to administer compared with other type of taxes (see section 4.2). For that reason tax
reform of existing taxes is very attractive for policy makers, as the effect on (marginal)
administrative cost can be expected to be small. A rise of the marginal carbon tax rate is
simpiy reached by using the existing implicit energy taxes on carbon, i.e. the existing
energy excises. Thus, tax rate reform is sufficient, i.e. a reform of currently existing
energy input taxes into taxes based on emission coefficients (see section 4.1).
Indeed, the strategy chosen by the Nordic countries when implementing carbon taxes,
basically follows this logic. We tentatively checked which products and agents were already
subject to energy excises in these countries in the pre-carbon tax period, say 1990.29 Table
5 presents our results. We distinguish between three potential groups of tax payers:
households (Hh), industrial consumers (I), and electricity generators (E). It is immediately
clear from this table that the most important carbon-containing energy products consumed
or produced in the Nordic countries were already subject to energy excises before the
introduction of the carbon tax. The basic picture was that existing excises were levied on
fuels consumed by households, with the exception of natural gas in Sweden and Norway
(which is a small category anyway). The inputs of electricity were usually not subject to
tax, in contrast to the delivery to consumers (both households and industries). Although
many energy products are subject to tax, including even the products used as inputs in43
industry, it turns out that the industrial sector is often exempted or pays lower tax rates,
especially energy intensive industries (refineries; steel and aluminium production).
INSERT Table 5
Thus,the effects on administrative cost of introducing carbon taxes on fuel content in these
countries is dominated by the use of the existing energy excise administration. As long as
this administration is also used for the carbon tax, one can safely assume a small rise in
administrative costs. The only factor that might give an upward effect is the more
complicated tax base calculations due to the integration of two instead of one indicator (both
energy content and carbon content). The same holds for carbon tax exemptions, especially
in the case of rebates. As noted before, rebates often complicate the tax and cause higher
administrative costs. If, however, exemptions in the carbon tax also take advantage of these
institutional set-up, additional administrative costs still need not be high (sunk cost
element).
In all Nordic countries, however, the carbon excise is also imposed on new
products, especially the production of electricity (use of inputs) and natural gas. Also coal
seems to be taxed now on a more comprehensive basis. But the effects on administrative
costs of these changes also seem to be limited. Like the existing excise systems for other
energy products, tax administration can take advantage of the way in which final fuel
products, like diesel or electricity, is usually delivered to consumers (both industry and
households). The administration of energy excise taxes saves on the number of tax payers
by using points of delivery (eg. fuel stations and energy distributors) instead of taxing all44
consumers separately. This is applicable in the case of natural gas (delivery through pipe
lines), as well as in the case of coal (points of distribution). Thus, the broadening of the tax
base implies only a small increase in the number of tax payers.
4.4 Scope for improvement
Although the current carbon tax strategy in the Nordic countries satifies the conditions for
using input taxes instead of emission taxes, considerable scope for improvements seems to
exist. The coverage of the carbon excises in the Nordic countries (as well as the
Netherlands) is far from exhaustive, especially in tenns of the agents subject to an effective
tax. Exemptions are widely used, mainly motivated by concerns about international
competiveness. Often energy inputs of domestic industries are taxed at lower rates or not
taxed at all. Furthermore, the existing energy excises related to oil products are of the final
fuel type, which implicitly exempts production of the fuels themselves. Also extraction of
any fossil fuel is not subject to this tax (although other type of taxes and subsidies apply).
Our theoretical results suggest that sectoral differentiations in the tax rate are
justified by administrative costs, if linkage and marginal abatement cost (MAC) differ
among sectors. Exemptions can also be justified by differences in fixed administrative
costs. A difference between linkage and MAC, as well as fixed administrative cost among
sectors, seems to apply in the carbon case. However, current differentiation is exactly the
opposite to what our model suggests as optimal. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (1997) have
shown that this observation generalizes across OECD countries. In general, households face
much higher taxes on average compared to industry. Furthermore, most OECD countries45
taxfinal oil products (diesel, gasoline) much more heavily compared to primary energy
products on average (heavy fuel oil, natural gas and coal). In this respect the countries that
introduced a carbon tax, already applied a much broader (implicit) carbon tax base
compared to the other countries.
Thus the industries that are usually exempted now, mainly the energy-intensive
industries (both producing energy products as energy-intensive products), are also the tax
payers who can be taxed with lowest transaction costs per unit emission. In other words,
the most important polluters (small number of tax payers consuming the larger part of fossil
fuels) still do not pay any or only a very small amount of tax. The same holds for the
choice to exempt certain energy products consumed by specific sectors, like coal by
electricity generation. Finally, not taxing particular energy products that cause considerable
carbon emissions, like coal, seems to be particularly unattractive.30 Of course, issues of
carbon leakage are of considerable importance here. If a country follows a unilateral
strategy without any compensation for its carbon-exposed industries, import substitution
could easily reduce the effectiveness of its carbon abatement policy. However, several
mechanisms are available to compensate for these effects with small or even no negative
effect on administrative costs, such as tax credits (Vollebergh et.al., 1997).
Another issue closely linked to the selectivity of coverage is that all explicit carbon
taxes are based simply on the amount of carbon contained in the actual products. This
implies that carbon emitted in the production processes producing those fuels is not taxed at
all. As Pearson and Smith (1991, p.29) noted long ago, such a scheme gives an undesirable
incentive towards the use of highly-refined fuel products, in which as much as possible of
the carbon emissions have taken place before the excise is applied. Thus this tax will be less46
efficient at encouraging carbon-reducing fuel substitutions. According to Vollebergh (1995)
it might be an efficient strategy in this case to use a materials balance approach to impute
the amount of upstream carbon emissions that are related to energy products of the final
fuel type.
A third possibility for improvement is to supplement current input taxes with
incentives for abatement (introducing a mixed system of input and emission taxes).
Although abatement of CO2 emissions is very limited for small energy users, large
industries and energy producers may have some opportunities for abatement that are less
costly than separate abatement possibilities like carbon sequestration. Large-scale firm-
specific investments are involved in these abatement projects. Emission taxes for energy
producers may provide appropriate abatement incentives. Moreover, the administration
costs for emission taxes in the energy production sector can be expected to be considerably
lower than for small industry and households. Technologies are more homogenous, and the
number of agents is small. For large energy-intensive industries, however, the
competitiveness argument may prevent the implementation of emission taxes, since these
taxes increase costs and require again compensation schemes. Alternatively, abatement
subsidies decrease costs, and seem more feasible.
The most important step toward more efficient carbon policies is explicit
coordination of carbon policies on EU, OECD or, better, world scale. Carbon leakage then
no longer offsets unilateral carbon policies. Thus, exemptions of large energy-intensive
exporting industries to restore international competitiveness would no longer be a
reasonable strategy. Only then it is possible to initiate a full-fledged tax reform toward
imposing carbon taxes on agents that have most options for abatement, contribute most to47
CO2 emissions, and for which the administrative costs involved are relatively smallest.48
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GJ Ton TOE Ton/TOE
Coal Metr.Ton 25-30 0.61 0.6 0.96-1.00
Crude Oil Barrel 6.1 0.12 1 0.76-0.84
Natural Gas 1000 m3 9.6-10.7 0.17 8.0 0.56-0.64
1) Based on average above (8,3738 1) and under (7,5357 14) Gronings' gas
Source: OECD/IEA (1991)
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Table2 Excise taxation of energy products in countries applying carbon taxes, 1997 '





ECU/l000 IECU/l000 I ECU/l000 1ECU/l000 I ECU/ton ECU/rn3 ECU/kWh
Denmark 533 321 236 266 160 0.03091 0.06719
Finland 616 307 50 38 29 0.02443 0.00533
Netherlands 579 302 47 16 0 0.00962 0
Norway 658 485 56 79 56 0.10897 0.00397
Sweden 597 337 210 217 144 0.12031 0.01316
EU minimum 337 245 18 13 0 0 0
EU prop 2000 450 343 37 23 13 0.01400 0.00200
CO2 taxes as well as existing energy excises per unit of fuel are included
Source: EkinsandSpeck (1999), Table 1, p.37156
Table3 Effective tax rates of explicit C02-taxes for some industries in the Nordic countries (in % of nominal
tax rates)
Energy products Sweden Denmark Norway Finland
Manufacturing Heavy processes Pulp/paper All industry
industry industry
Gas oil (heating) 0.50 0.24 0.50 1.0
Heavy fuel oil 0.50 0.23 0.50 1.0
LPG 0.50 0.25 0 0
Coal 0.50 0.25 1.0 1.0
natural gas 0.50 0.24 1.0 1.0
Source: own calculations based on Ekins and Speck (1999), p.38057
Table4 Relative administrative and compliance costs of different type of taxes






%Total Revenue %Total Revenue %Total Revenue
Income tax 1.53 3.40 4.93
VAT 1.03 3.69 4.72
Corporation tax 0.52 2.22 2.74
Petroleum revenue tax 0.12 0.44 0.56
Excise duties (hydrocarbon oils; 0.25 0.20 0.45
tobacco; alcoholic drinks)
Minor taxes (stamp duty; car, 0.85 1.48 2.33
betting and gambling)
Source: Sandford et a!. (1989), p.19258
Table5 Energy Excises Applying to Households, industry and the Electricity Sector in the Nordic countries in
1990
Energy product Sweden Denmark Norway Finland
Hh I EHh I EHh I E HhIE
- Diesel ++ -++-++ - ++ -
- Heavyfuel - + 0 - +0 -+ 0 -++
-Coal ++ 0+ + 0 0 0 na na++
- Naturalgas 00 0+ na na 0 0 0 ++ na
- Electricity ++ -+ 0 -++ - + 0 -
Notes: Hh: Households; I: Industry; E: Electricity Generation;
+ =tax;0 =notax; -= notused; na =notavailable.
Source: OECD Energy Prices and Taxes; OECD (1993); IFA (1993)59
NOTES:
1.The relation between taxation in general and transaction costs is more widely
analysed, see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998) for an overview.
2.Section 4.2, however, shows that administrative and compliance costs turn out to
move together in practice, that is, taxes for which compliance costs are relatively important
are also associated with relatively high administrative costs).
3.The term "gross welfare cost" is due to Goulder (1995).
4.This definition applies to corrective taxes. The gross welfare cost in case of revenue
raising can be similarly defmed as the change in welfare apart from that arising from
relaxing the government budget constraint.
5.There is an interesting analogue between the current paper and the long standing issue
in environmental economics of selecting instruments to improve ambient quality directly or
indirectly through the reduction of emissions. It is well-known that linkage between
emissions and ambient quality is often indirect, but the cost of ambient quality regulation
can be prohibitive. Thus an interesting trade-off exist between the utility loss in terms of
the directness of linkage on the one hand, and the cost of regulation on the other hand. We
owe this point to Dallas Burtraw.
6.We realize that this term might be misleading, since transaction costs also affect
(ultimately) private welfare. However, the term captures the fact that we focus on
administrative costs that first affect the tax authority (and not directly private agents).
Indeed of the three terms in (1), only the first captures direct changes in private welfare.
The third term, the environmental gain, is a "public" component of the welfare change if
the environment is assumed to be a public good. Alternatively, we could have used the60
terms "frictionless gross welfare cost" and "frictionless efficiency".
7.In fact, Smith (1992) has shown that the basic idea can be traced back to the seminal
paper of Diamond (1972).
8.We also abstract from output taxes and abatement subsidies. See Smulders and
Vollebergh (1999) for the interaction between these instruments and administrative costs.
9.Furthermore, e">0,e">0,and l">O. We ensure concavity by assuming
[l"+(—ea )e']e "—(—ea ')(e )2> 0
10. with at least one equality
11. To simplify notation, all summation sign refer to summation over all final goods
sectors, unless stated otherwise.
12. Note that, by assuming linear sectoral separability, we ignore economies of scope as
discussed in section 2.
13. See the analysis in Bovenberg and Goulder (1998, section 3.1).
14. Note that equations (2), (3), (4), (5) and (8) allow us to determine how a, x:, q., Pj
and p --andhence also 1(x1), e(a1,x1),E1,X,, T and U --dependon the tax rates.
15. This condition can be called the "entry condition" analogous to industrial organization
models where firms enter if the operating profits (cf. welfare), measured at the optimal
price (cf. tax), exceed the entry cost (cf. tax introduction/set-up cost).
16. To be precise, (is the tax that maximizes welfare given the set of taxes employed;
(=0 if (15) is violated.
17. Solving the social planner problem for the case without transaction costs, we fmd the
following optimality conditions: (i) u, '=i+a1 +x1 + e1D',(ii)1 ￿— eatV / (iii)
1 ￿— i'-e1 V / Comparing these conditions to (2), (3), (4), (5) and (8) we find that61
z =D', t, =0implements the first-best outcome. As a special case, if e '=0 and e1 '—e1/x1
Vi, any combination of taxes that satisfies(x1/e)t1=D'Vi, also implements the first-best
social optimum (input taxes and emission taxes are equivalent, cf. section 3.4).
18. For this case d U/cit reduces to (i—D ')dE,/dr which is positive for t<D'.Hence the
left-hand side of the second inequality in (15) is positive while the right-hand side is zero
and (15) is satisfied.
19. Similarly, two-parts instruments may do the job. If only one pollutant causes an
externality and if all other outputs and inputs can be taxed at zero transaction cost, the first-
best outcome can be reached (see Fullerton and Wolverton 1997). In the present model this
would require a (sector-specific) taxes on output and input use and a (sector-specific)
subsidy on abatement. Note, however, that optimality breaks down once more pollutants
play a role.
20. To see this, substitute (17) into (18).
21. Note that (x1/e1)2(, + f)= - dX1Idtand (x1/e1)(e += - dE1/dt,,=- dX/dz.
22. It can be derived from (3) and (4) that dx/de'(da1Idt) + e' (dx1/dt).
23. Barthold mentions 51 federal tax code provisions for the US (Barthold, 1994) and the
OECD in more recent inventories also mentions a much larger number of relevant taxes.
24. Sandford et a!. (1989) analyse administrative and compliance costs of different taxes
in the UK in 1986-1987. OECD (1988) discusses operating cost for consumption taxes
relative to other taxes.
25. See the discussion in Cnossen (1994).
26. Note that the tax base of specific excises requires physical control due to the physical
dimensions in which they are usually expressed ($perunit, litre, etc). This is62
fundamentally different from taxes expressed on an ad valorem basis (% of price or (added)
value).
27. Of course, many opportunities exist for savings on energy use (improvements of
energy efficiency) which also implicitly reduces carbon emissions (Eskelund and
Deravajan, 1996). However, the condition applied here is the improvement of carbon
efficiency at the margin (as measured through the efficiency edge of emission taxes over
input taxes, see section 3.4). We also exclude 'compensation' techniques, like carbon
sequestration (by planting trees), as they are not directly related to the production
techniques employed for producing output.
28. This might change if carbon tax policy would become more strict as technological
improvements might considerably reduce the cost of existing carbon abatement potentials.
29. We only checked excises as the introduction of a carbon tax is closely related to
existing energy excises. Furthermore, in terms of the fixed cost element, it is not important
whether these products are VAT-exempt or not. As discussed in section 4.2, the
administrative procedures for VAT differ considerably with excise administration.
30.OECD (1998) shows that coal is even still subsidised in quite a number of OECD
countries.U
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